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Ireland has long been positively construed in the German literary imagination (O’Neill, 2010: 
83) and has enjoyed a special relationship with Germany in modern times (Veit Müller, 2006). 
The central romantic motif of “die grüne Insel” [“the green island”] which emanated from 
tourist and travel literature, influenced in particular by Heinrich Böll’s Irisches Tagebuch, 
played a pivotal role in shaping perceptions of Ireland in German public discourse in the post-
war period persisting to the present day (Holfter, 1996; Holfter, 2011; Sagarra, 2010). The 
positive associations generated by this idealised image of ‘poor but lovable’ which persisted 
up to the late 1990s also influenced German media discourse concerned with economic and 
political relations between the two countries. The Irish were viewed in the main as “good 
Europeans” – “‘die stets Europa-enthusiastischen Iren’, [“the eternally Europhile Irish”] – who 
were grateful for their inclusion in the EU club of rich countries and who were the worthy 
recipients of funds from net contributors such as Germany” (Kelly-Holmes & O’Regan, 2004: 
82). It has been shown that this generally favourable assessment of Ireland in German press 
coverage waned during the Celtic-Tiger years. The sudden transformation in the Irish economy 
prompted a reappraisal of traditional perceptions of Ireland by media commentators who 
seemed unsure how to view this new development: “Die grüne Insel, jahrhundertelang das 
Armenhaus Europas, blüht auf […] Nun feiern sie sich als ‘keltischer Tiger’” [“The green 
island, for centuries the poor house of Europe is blooming […] Now they are congratulating 
themselves on being the Celtic Tiger”] (Der Spiegel 23/1997: 150, cited in Kelly-Holmes, 
2002: 190).1 Kelly-Holmes points out that while the Irish were still seen as good Europeans 
this was to some extent subsequently negatively constructed as a function of Ireland being one 
of the major beneficiaries of EU funding (2002: 193). This more critical perception of Ireland 
in the context of EU relations was further reinforced after Ireland’s rejection of the Nice Treaty 
                                                             
1 Translation in Kelly-Holmes, 2002: 190.  
in a referendum in June 2001 which provoked a hostile response in the German press: Ireland 
was castigated as ungrateful and greedy, one of the “spoilt children of Europe” (Kelly-Holmes 
& O’Regan, 2004). It can be argued, that while such negative coverage runs counter to the 
idealised view of Ireland in Germany, the consequences have not entailed a seismic shift in 
German attitudes overall towards Ireland, but rather a recalibration and reappraisal prompting, 
as Holfter notes, more ambivalence than was previously the case (Holfter, 2012: 170f.).2  
 Against the backdrop of changing perceptions of Ireland in German media coverage 
since the late 1990s, this chapter investigates the current image of Ireland and the Irish in 
German media discourse in the context of the Eurozone crisis and the collapse of the Celtic 
Tiger. It seeks to trace and analyse some of the diverse narratives of Ireland’s economic crisis 
and changing perspectives in German media coverage through the lens of Critical Discourse 
Analysis [CDA]. CDA sees language use as a social practice, assuming a dialectical 
relationship between discursive acts and the social structures in which they occur (Fairclough, 
1995: 54f.; Wodak, 1999: 8). This approach is fundamentally concerned with opaque 
relationships of power manifested in language reflecting Habermas’s claim that “language is 
also a medium of domination […] It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. In so far 
as the legitimations of power relations […] are not articulated [...] language is also ideological” 
(Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 2). According to Wodak, 
CDA makes it possible to analyse pressures from above and possibilities of resistance to 
unequal power relationships that appear as societal conventions. According to this view, 
dominant structures stabilize conventions and naturalize them…they are taken as ‘given’. 
Resistance is then seen as the breaking of conventions, of stable discursive practices, in acts 
of ‘creativitiy’. (Wodak, 2001: 3) 
 
This study draws from a cross-section of German daily and weekly national broadsheets and 
newsmagazines, representing a variety of outlooks on the political spectrum and includes 
examples of news and documentary coverage from the broadcast media.  
 
Perceptions of Ireland since the Bailout 
In terms of German media coverage in general since the EU-ECB-IMF bailout in November 
2010, the initial impression is that the ramifications for Ireland’s image in Germany have not 
                                                             
2 As Holfter points out, the “German view of Ireland has become more multi-faceted” during the period of the 
Celtic Tiger and its demise and the “German perspective has become a far more ambivalent one, though 
arguably still overwhelmingly positive” (2012: 170f.). In terms of political relations it is interesting to note the 
change in wording and tone since the turn of the millennium on the website of the German Department of 
Foreign Affairs, explicitly mentioning “differences on fiscal and social policy” (O’Reilly and Holfter, 2009: 
170). 
been as far-reaching or as damaging as they might have been. For example, as Holfter notes, 
Ireland has not been subjected to the type of vitriolic coverage directed at Greece3 (Holfter, 
2012: 170f.). Scally refers to the resilience of German-Irish relations in the current crisis, 
maintaining that,  
Germany’s love for Ireland is complex and deep, and exists in a separate dimension to the 
Eurozone crisis. Polls show repeatedly that Germans make a clear distinction between 
Ireland and Greece – like Angela Merkel, they think the Irish are working but that the Greeks 
are not. (Scally, 2012)4 
 
On the diplomatic front, German-Irish relations appear to have remained cordial despite the 
economic turmoil caused by the Irish banking crisis. In April 2010, Guido Westerwelle, 
German foreign minister at the time, expressed his gratitude to Ireland for its role in securing 
EU backing for German unification twenty years earlier, stating that “it was an immensely 
important step, largely promoted by our Irish friends” stressing that “Germany would never 
forget it” (Scally, 2010).  
 While it is evident that many German people continue to view Ireland favourably and 
German media coverage has differentiated between Ireland and Greece in the context of the 
Eurozone crisis, the portrayal of Ireland during this period has not been homogenous or static 
but rather can be viewed as contested and changing. It reflects diverse and shifting discourses 
and attitudes which both naturalise and resist underlying ideologies, taking an unexpected turn 
during Ireland’s Presidency of the EU in June 2013 in response to the Anglo Irish Bank tapes 
scandal. This chapter aims to elucidate some of these diverse economic metanarratives in 
German press coverage of Ireland against the backdrop of a deepening recession in Europe. 
 
“Casino of Europe” 
Much of the mainstream German media coverage of the Eurozone crisis has primarily 
construed it in terms of a “them and us” discourse (van Dijk, 2001: 103) focusing attention on 
differences and disparities between nations states within the Union and in tandem allocating 
blame to those nations deemed to have behaved recklessly and opportunistically. There is a 
widespread acceptance and reinforcement of the idea that German taxpayers are now having to 
bear the brunt of the financial fall-out, which, it is frequently suggested, has been caused by 
                                                             
3 See Holfter, 2012. While noting a tone of “overbearing condescension” in some press coverage, Holfter points 
out that “reporting on Ireland’s economic misfortunes has not been as bad as it could have been, remarking in 
particular on the contrast between reporting on Greece and Ireland” (Holfter, 2012: 170f.).   
4 It is interesting to note that the Irish Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, was awarded the Golden Victoria for “European 
of the Year”, by the Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger on the 8 November 2012 in Berlin. 
the profligacy of the peripheral Eurozone countries, viewed as “problem states” within a 
supposedly economically healthy Europe (Fahrmeir, 2011). This ethnocentric narrative, 
emanating from official sources and elites has been widely echoed by sections of the German 
press. It can be argued that this discourse implicitly reflects national self-interest while being 
presented as normative in public debate, thereby not only undermining social cohesion within 
the European Union but also diverting public attention away from a more comprehensive 
understanding of the roots of the Eurozone crisis and the failure on the part of Eurozone 
political elites to respond adequately.  
 According to Fairclough, “Metaphors structure the way we think and the way we act, 
and our systems of knowledge and belief, in a pervasive and fundamental way” (Fairclough, 
1992: 194). Images associated with irresponsibility and recklessness, for instance that of a 
“casino”, are deployed in much of the German media coverage of Ireland especially in the early 
stages of the crisis. For example, the causes of Ireland’s economic downfall are explained in 
an opinion article in Die Zeit by juxtaposing traditional tropes familiar to readers, “grüne Insel” 
[“green island”] with a new contrasting metaphor with less positive connotations to dramatic 
effect: “Lange war die grüne Insel so etwas wie das Eldorado der Finanzindustrie” and “Irland 
war das Kasino Europas” [“For a long time the green island was something like the Eldorado 
of the financial industry” and “Ireland was the casino of Europe”] (Gatzke, 2010). A similar 
juxtaposition of images is rearticulated in an article in Spiegel International, in the form of a 
rhetorical question, conveying a sense of disillusionment and disappointment that things were 
not as they appeared, in fact things had become quite the opposite to received images of the 
country in Germany:  
Until now, Ireland’s image abroad had been characterised by such things as green 
landscapes, Guinness, and slightly eccentric but good-hearted people in thick woollen 
sweaters whose interest in gambling was, at most, limited to the race track. How could 
Europe’s apparently most easy-going country have turned into a casino in such a short 
time – a paradise for real estate sharks, investment bankers and other financial 
troublemakers? […] The international financial world…responded to Ireland’s 
invitation to set up shop in the Docklands special economic zone. Ireland attracted them 
the way it had once attracted German hippies, dreamers and Heinrich Böll. Many banks 
established so-called special purpose vehicles in Ireland to remove the riskiest deals 
from their balance sheets at home […]. (Feldenkirchen, 2010a) 
 
While traditional images of Ireland construct the country and its people as laid-back and 
harmless, this new perception represents an inverse evaluation of Ireland’s national character: 
it is now deemed to pose a serious threat to the continent of Europe: “For weeks now, the nation 
has kept the continent in suspense, causing the euro to falter and with it shaking the very 
foundation of the European Union” (ibid.). 
 Much of the mainstream German media coverage of Ireland’s bailout in November 
2010 reflects this discourse, constructing a narrative which focuses on the failures and mistakes 
of crisis countries including Irish political culture as part of an outgroup of ‘weaker’ nations. 
The tone is frequently one of impatience with those countries who are seen to be threatening 
Germany’s prosperity and Germany is viewed as the one who needs to get such countries into 
line whether they like it or not, as the following lines from Die Zeit illustrate:  
Sündenfall Irland: Nun bedrohen alle diese Länder unsere Währung und unseren 
Wohlstand. Vorbei die Hoffnung, die schwächeren Länder könnten zu den stärkeren 
aufschlieβen und alle zusammen könnten dem groβen Schuldenmachen abschwören...Es 
ist die Rolle der wiedererstarkten Deutschen, dabei der gröβte Zahler und der lauteste 
Mahner zugleich zu sein. Beliebt können wir uns später machen. (Heuser, 2010)  
 
[Ireland’s fall from grace. Now all these countries are threatening our currency and our 
prosperity. The hope that the weaker countries could catch up with the stronger ones and 
together they could forego running up large debts is over […] It is the role of the 
restrengthened Germans to be the main paymaster and at the same time the loudest 
admonisher. We can make ourselves popular later.]  
 
An article in Die Welt leads with the headline, “Was Irlands Rettung den Steuerzahler kostet”, 
stating that “Die Euro-Länder und der IWF unterstützen Irland mit Milliarden” (Schiltz, 2010) 
[“What Ireland’s rescue is costing the taxpayer” ... “The Euro countries and the IMF are 
supporting Ireland with millions”]. A “them and us” discourse, illustrated in the following 
excerpt from Die Zeit, reflects a strategy of “[…] ‘positive self-presentation and negative other 
presentation’ in which our good things and their bad things are emphasized” (van Dijk, 2001: 
103) paying little if any attention to the broader political, financial and economic context,  
Doch sind die gebeutelten Iren aus kontinentaleuropäischer Sicht vor allem ein Problem, 
eben weil sie gegenüber ihren Euro-Partnern in den vergangenen Jahren alles andere als an 
meitheal praktiziert haben. Im keltischen Boom nach der Euro-Einführung haben die Iren 
viel mehr verbraucht, als sie geerntet haben. Die Banken der Insel warfen seit den neunziger 
Jahren mit Krediten für Häuser, Autos und Luxusgüter nur so um sich, und die Bevölkerung 
griff gierig zu. (Bittner, 2010) 
 
[But the financially strapped Irish are above all a problem from a Continental point of 
view because in recent years they have practised everything but an meitheal (solidarity) 
with their European partners. During the Celtic boom after the introduction of the Euro 
the Irish consumed far more than they reaped. The island’s banks spent money like water 
since the 1990s with credit for houses, cars and luxury goods and the population greedily 
helped themselves.]  
 
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also focuses on political ineptitude and provincialism in 
Ireland as the cause of the crisis (Leithäuser, 2010a; Betrugsverdacht, 2012). For example, an 
article entitled “Wenn Iren irre werden” [“When the Irish go mad”], stresses how EU funds 
were wasted due to cronyism and incompetence,  
Die Menschen auf der Grünen Insel sind gebeutelt. Kein Wunder in einer Krise, die seit 
zwei Jahren immer neue Hiobsbotschaften gebiert. Zwar gab es üppige EU-Finanzhilfen – 
doch wurden die auch von der Vetternwirtschaft aufgesaugt. (Leithäuser, 2010b)  
 
[The people of the green island are strapped for cash. No wonder, in a crisis, which for two 
years has kept on generating bad news. Indeed, there was abundant EU financial support – 
but this was also soaked up by cronyism.] 
 
Unsurprisingly, a more strident, exasperated tone dominates in the Axel Springer national daily 
tabloid Bild.5 The explicit theme of the Germans bailing out yet another profligate nation in the 
EU, who are ungrateful for the help they are receiving, dominated the headlines in the early 
stages of the crisis:  
 
Müssen wir jetzt auch noch die Iren retten? (2010) 
[Do we now also have to rescue the Irish?] 
 
Warum sollen deutsche Steuerzahler für Irland zahlen? (2010) 
[Why should German taxpayers pay for Ireland?] 
 
 Euro-Alarm: Iren kriegen Milliarden. (2010) 
[Euro-Alarm: The Irish are getting billions.] 
 
Irland-Pleite: Müssen wir am Ende für ganz Europa zahlen? (2010)  
[Ireland-Bankrupt: Do we have to pay for all of Europe in the end?]  
 
A less polarising, albeit patronising, tone is struck in Der Spiegel. In an article by Markus 
Feldenkirchen, the Celtic-Tiger metaphor is juxtaposed with a new image of an “exhausted 
kitten” to represent Ireland’s new political and economic status and the new state of German-
Irish relations:  
Der keltische Tiger liegt nun da wie ein entkräftetes Kätzchen, zerzaust, geschlagen. Die 
Deutschen sollten es gütig behandeln, so wie man junge Katzen behandelt, die toben 
wollten und über die Stränge schlugen, die etwas ausprobieren wollten, was sie bislang 
nicht kannten. Man haut ihnen auf die Pfoten, stellt neue, strengere Spielregeln auf, gibt 
ihnen Milch und hofft auf Läuterung. 
                                                             
5 Bild is Europe’s biggest-selling newspaper with a circulation of 3 million daily, reaching 12 million readers. It 
has been criticised for wielding too much power over political leaders in Germany and for influencing Angela 
Merkel’s tough stance on Eurozone bailouts (See Pidd, 2011). 
Und dann sollte man das Sorgenkind weiter besuchen. “Es gibt dieses Irland”, hatte 
Heinrich Böll seinem Tagebuch vorangestellt. “Wer aber hinfährt und es nicht findet, hat 
keine Ersatzansprüche an den Autor”. (Feldenkirchen, 2010b)  
 
[The Celtic Tiger is now in a sorry state, like an exhausted kitten, dishevelled, beaten. The 
Germans should treat it gently just like you treat young cats that wanted to romp around 
and kick over the traces, run riot, to try out things that were new to them. You smack them 
on the paws, give them new, stricter rules of the game, give them milk and hope for 
improvement.  
And then one should continue visiting the problem child. “This Ireland exists” was Heinrich 
Böll’s preamble to his Journal “but whoever goes there and fails to find it has no claim on 
the author”.] (Translation in Holfter, 2012: 170) 
 
Atoning for the Past – from ‘Problem-Child’ to ‘Model Pupil’ 
While Ireland’s recovery efforts have received widespread positive coverage in the German 
media, much of the discourse uncritically reflects the economic metanarrative of political elites 
based on the prevailing neo-liberal assumption that markets should be purely self-regulating. 
According to van Dijk, 
[…] the contents of group ideologies pertain to what, for each group, is the preferred social 
and moral order […] the fundamental social role of positive self-images for most groups will 
usually entail that groups develop an ideology which they see as ethically good or defensible. 
Thus, whereas […] proponents of a neo-liberal ideology may recognize that ‘liberalization’ 
and other market policies may make the rich richer and the poor poorer, it is likely that the 
underlying ideology maintains that the freedom of the market will eventually benefit all. 
(van Dijk, 1998: 72f.)  
 
The dominant representation of Ireland since the bailout in German media is that of a 
“Musterfall’, [“model case”] which, as the Süddeutsche Zeitung puts it, is successfully 
emerging from the financial disaster, like a “phoenix rising from the Atlantic” (Oldag, 2013). 
The idea that Ireland has sinned but is paying the penalty and as a result is a good role model 
for Greece reflects the underlying narrative in much of the coverage, exemplified here in Fokus 
in 2011, “Irland auf Erholungskurs: Hoffnungsschimmer am Rande Europas” [“Ireland on the 
way to recovery: A glimmer of hope at the edge of Europe”]. The article implicitly praises 
Ireland’s reform efforts and acceptance of responsibility deploying the language of morality in 
the sub-heading, “Selbst schuld! – Ein reumütiges Vorbild für Griechenland” [“Your own fault! 
– A repentant role model for Greece”] and states that if one is in need of being cheered up one 
should look to the Northwest: “Dass die grüne Insel in letzter Zeit kaum mehr in den 
Schlagzeilen vorkommt, ist ein gutes Zeichen. Noch vor knapp einem Jahr war die Republik 
Sorgenkind Nummer eins” (Che Berberich, 2011) [“The fact that the green island has recently 
hardly been in the headlines is a good sign. Less than a year ago the republic was problem child 
number one.”]  
 This theme is continued in media representation of Ireland during 2012 which, in the 
main, essentially constructs the country as the “Musterknabe” (“model boy”) who has taken 
the pain without grumbling and is now over the crisis. Ireland is widely perceived as exemplary 
in its recovery efforts having complied fully and dutifully in a spirit of humility with the 
demands of the Troika and, as Focus stresses, not only announced reforms but also 
implemented them rigorously in contrast to other European problem countries (Hoffmann, 
2012). This coverage, which holds Ireland up as the poster-boy to other crisis countries in the 
Eurozone, explicitly emphasises the success of the EU bailout and austerity strategy in what 
might be described as a school-masterly tone:  
Vorbildliche Haushaltssanierung: Irland kriegt die Kurve 
Hallo, Spanien! Hallo, Portugal! Vor allem: Hallo, Griechenland! So geht das! Schaut nach 
Irland – als ein Beispiel dafür, wie sich ein Land aus dem Schuldensog ziehen kann. Mit viel 
Unterstützung der anderen Euro-Länder, der Europäischen Zentralbank und des 
Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF). Aber mit viel eigener Leistung. (ibid.) 
 
[Exemplary budget reorganisation: Ireland is getting its act together. 
Hello, Spain! Hello, Portugal! Above all: hello, Greece! This is how it works! Look at Ireland 
– as an example of how a country can pull itself out of the maelstrom of debt. With a lot of 
support from other Euro countries, the European central bank and the IMF. But with much 
effort on its own part.]  
 
The metaphorical use of the discourse of family relations to describe political 
relationships between countries within the European Union is common in media representation. 
Fairclough maintains the use of such tropes is significant as media language can work 
ideologically through “particular constructions of social relations, e.g. the construction of 
relations between politicians and the public as relations between people in a shared ‘lifeworld’” 
(Fairclough, 1995: 12).6 The use of ‘problem child’ and ‘model boy/pupil’ metaphors pervades 
much of the mainstream German media coverage of Ireland during the Eurozone financial 
crisis. Typically, the underlying tone of these ‘lifeworld’ representations of the Irish state 
involves either praise or censure: praise for its efforts in reforming itself or reprimand for 
behaving recklessly. The motif of the problem child appears frequently in coverage prior to the 
EU-ECB-IMF bailout: (“Irland und Portugal bleiben Sorgenkinder”, 2010; “Irland – Europas 
                                                             
6 In an earlier study of German media representation of Ireland, Kelly-Holmes and O’Regan have shown that the 
metaphorical and lexical fields of childhood, ingratitude, destruction and greed characterised German media 
coverage of Ireland during Ireland’s referenda to ratify the Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002 (2004: 96).  
 
neues Sorgenkind”, 2010; “Schuldenkrise: Europa bangt um seine Sorgenkinder”, 2010). Just 
over a year later the image of the ‘model pupil’ is dominant, foregrounded for example in the 
following headline in a TV news report on tagesschau broadcast by ARD and watched by up 
to 10 million viewers: “Irland – der Musterschüler in der Euro-Krise” [“Ireland – the model 
pupil in the Euro crisis”]. This metaphor is also employed on the website version of tagesschau 
and on a related radio broadcast: “Sie können sich als Europas Musterschüler betrachten” 
(Wesel, 2011) [“They can view themselves as Europe’s model pupils”]. The motif recurs across 
various print media during the same period reflecting a consensus in much of the coverage 
regarding Ireland’s status and role in the crisis (Kaiser, 2011; Theurer, 2012; Schuldenkrise, 
2012; Nur Irland, 2013).  
 While the tone of such coverage reflects admiration for Ireland’s efforts at reform and 
compliance with the policies of austerity, the upbeat, encouraging tone associated with these 
images hardens at times to that of an authority figure dealing with a greedy child pushing the 
boundaries who needs to be firmly admonished. This can be seen in the tone and choice of 
metaphor in Die Welt early on in the crisis: “Die Iren hätten vor lauter 
Immobilienspekulationen verlernt, dass man für Erfolg arbeiten muss. ‘Wir waren wie Kinder, 
die sich ohne Aufsicht in einem Süβigkeitengeschäft die Bäuche vollschlugen’” (Kaiser, 
2011a) [“The Irish had forgotten, as a result of property speculation, that one has to work for 
success. ‘We were like children without supervision in a sweet shop who stuffed ourselves’”]. 
This tone of parental exasperation recurs in the context of positive perceptions of Ireland’s 
recovery and adherence to austerity targets, particularly around times of critical negotiations 
with the European Union in relation to easing the burden of Irish legacy bank debt. The 
following lines from an opinion article in Der Spiegel in 2013 convey implicit criticism of 
Ireland and reveal a note of exasperation with the model boy who is coming back looking for 
more money: 
Rettung für den Musterknaben: Irlands Regierungschef will sich in Deutschland als 
Reformvorreiter präsentieren – und um Geld bitten: Europa soll die Risiken für die 
Bankschulden übernehmen. (Pauly, 2013) 
 
[Rescue for the model boy: Ireland’s prime minister wants to present himself in Germany as 
a reformer – and to ask for money: Europe is supposed to take on the risks for bank debts.] 
  
Shortly afterwards, in March 2013, a similar tone can be detected, communicated through the 
image of the ‘demanding child’ which underlies some of the lexical choices in the following 
lines from Die Welt:  
 
Irland sollte als Musterfall europäischer Rettungspolitik den anderen Krisenländern ein 
leuchtendes Beispiel sein. Und es sollte den zweifelnden Deutschen zeigen, dass ihr Geld 
nicht in den riesigen Haushaltslöchern der Problemstaaten versickert. Ausgerechnet Irland 
aber will jetzt Woche für Woche eine Extrawurst gebraten haben. [...]  
 
Der Ärger ist verständlich. Denn kaum haben die Iren mit Hilfe der Europäischen 
Zentralbank (EZB) eine günstige Umschuldung für die Garantien ihrer Bad Banks gefunden, 
wollen sie ein weiteres Bonbon. Irlands Regierungschef (sic) Michael Noonan fordert bei 
einem Treffen der Euro-Finanzminister eine Verlängerung der Hilfskredite für sein Land um 
durchschnittlich 15 Jahre. (Dams/Greive, 2013a) 
 
[Ireland is supposed to be a shining example to the other crisis countries as a model case for 
European rescue policies. And it is supposed to show the doubting Germans that their money 
is not trickling away into the enormous budget deficits of the problem countries. Now, week 
after week, Ireland of all countries wants to get special treatment. […] 
The anger is understandable. For the Irish with the help of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
have barely got favourable debt rescheduling in relation to guarantees of their bad banks, 
and now they want more goodies. Ireland’s prime minister (sic) Michael Noonan is 
demanding an extension of credit for his country of fifteen years on average at a meeting of 
Euro-finance ministers.]  
 
Around this time the attempt by Ireland to negotiate improved terms also drew implicit 
criticism from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in language which betrays a sense of 
disbelief that the ‘model’ pupil’ could behave like this:  
Irland gilt eigentlich als Musterschüler unter den Euro-Krisenländern. Dank früher Reformen 
hat das Land verlorenes Vertrauen an den Finanzmärkten zurückgewonnen. Dennoch dringt 
das Land nun auf eine Verlängerung der Hilfskredite. (Schuldenkrise, 2013) 
 
[Ireland is considered to be the model pupil among the Euro-crisis countries. Thanks to early 
reforms the country won back trust from the financial markets which had been lost. Yet, the 
country is now pressing for an extension of rescue credit.] 
 
The theme of Ireland’s success continues in the press in 2013 (Plickert, 2013; Aufatmen in der 
Euro-Zone, 2013; Heise, 2013). Fokus, for example, leads with the headline, “Der erstaunliche 
Erfolg der stillen Inselbewohner: Warum die Iren triumphieren und die Griechen versagen” 
[“The amazing success of the quiet islanders: Why the Irish are triumphing and the Greeks are 
failing”] and elaborates that Ireland is almost on top of its debt crisis while Greece is nowhere 
near it. Ireland has won back the trust of the financial markets and will successfully exit the 
bailout programme at the end of 2013. Ireland is perceived as exemplary in its efforts to fulfil 
all the terms imposed on it by the EU-ECB-IMF and political leaders are praised for their 
achievements. Notwithstanding praise for Ireland’s performance in implementing reform, 
some coverage of Ireland’s economic fortunes continued to evince a negative tone particularly, 
as mentioned above, at critical junctures in EU negotiations, for instance around extending the 
timeframe for repayment of Ireland’s promissory note: (Dams/Greive, 2013a; 2013b; 
Schuldenkrise, 2013). There is also a tendency to revert to stereotypes casting the Irish as 
greedy and duplicitous. The tone of an opinion article in Der Spiegel, for example, is cynical 
about the Taoiseach’s motives in meeting Angela Merkel, presenting him as disingenuous and 
devious. The article portrays Enda Kenny as a charlatan trying to convince people that his 
country is exemplary in its reforms while in reality deploying a charm offensive in order to 
extract money from Europe, and pass on the risks for bank debt to Europe.  
Die Charmeoffensive des Iren ist nicht ganz uneigennützig. Seit über zwei Jahren versucht 
Kenny unter heftigem Beifall der angelsächsischen Medien, die kostspielige Rechnung für 
die Rettung der maroden irischen Banken an die europäischen Steuerzahler weiterzureichen. 
Aber die Europäer sperrten sich bisher unter Führung der Deutschen. (Pauly, 2013) 
 
[The charm offensive of the Irishman is not entirely unselfserving. For over two years Kenny 
has tried to pass on the bill for the bad Irish banks, with loud applause from the Anglo-Saxon 
media, to the European taxpayer. But the Europeans have blocked it up to now under the 
leadership of the Germans.] 
 
Ireland is characterised as self-serving and primarily concerned with narrow national vested 
interests in its Presidency of the European Council which could potentially be expensive for 
the Germans (ibid.). Ireland, it states, will have to pull off a magic trick in order to avoid 
needing a second official rescue package by the end of the year.  
 
Contesting the Crisis  
An alternative view of the financial crisis in Ireland, which exposes the superficiality of the 
solidarity rhetoric on the part of politicians and focuses on the roots of the crisis and the wider 
context, is also present, albeit to a lesser extent, in German media coverage during this period. 
An article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for example, entitled “Die List der deutschen 
Banken” [“The Deceit of the German Banks”] on 22 November 2010, the day after the rescue 
programme was announced, is extremely critical of the role of German banks in orchestrating 
Ireland’s bailout, clearly ascribing responsibility for the debacle to them: “Deutschland soll 
jetzt auch Irland retten. Und die deutschen Banken finden das gut. Kein Wunder. Denn das 
schont ihre Bilanzen vor Abschreibungen. Längst hat die Finanzwelt die Politik fest im Griff ” 
(Nienhaus & Siedenbiedel, 2010) [“Germany is now to rescue Ireland too. And the German 
banks find that good. No wonder. For this spares their balance sheets from write-offs. For a 
long time, the financial world has had the politicians under its control”]. The link between Irish 
and German banks in the crisis is signalled by a photograph at the top of the article which plays 
on a familiar, traditional agrarian image of Ireland showing the sea in the background and sheep 
in the foreground. The image conveys traditional positive perceptions of Ireland while 
simultaneously criticising Irish and German banks by utilising a stock metaphor in the caption: 
“Die irischen Banken haben sich verspekuliert. Und mit ihnen auch die deutschen Banken: die 
bringen jetzt ihre Schäfchen ins Trockene”. [“The Irish banks have gambled and lost? And with 
them also the German banks: they are now bringing their sheep onto dry land”]. The article 
maintains that Josef Ackermann’s (Deutsche Bank CEO) advice to the European Commission 
and Council and the single market commissioner that EU states should give Ireland a financial 
leg up should not be taken as evidence of Ackermann’s enthusiasm for Europe but as an 
indication, rather, of the bank’s vested interests:  
Wenn Europa Irland hilft, hilft es auch den deutschen Banken. Die nämlich sind zweitgröβter 
Gläubiger Irlands nach den Briten. Sie haben mehr als hundert Milliarden Euro an Krediten 
in Irland vergeben, davon allein rund 40 Milliarden an die irischen Banken (Nienhaus & 
Siedenbiedel, 2010).  
 
[When Europe helps Ireland, it is also helping the German banks. They are Ireland’s second 
biggest creditor after Britain. They have given more than a 100 billion Euro credit to Ireland, 
of that 40 billion alone to Irish banks.] 
 
While German banks openly advocated helping Ireland because of their involvement with the 
country, the article points out that they prefer not to disclose exactly which financial institutions 
provided the enormous amount of credit and to whom. The article highlights the brazenness of 
the banks’ stance by quoting Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the Munich Ifo-Institut (Institute for 
Economic Research) who sees ‘“eine Achse von der Europäischen Union zu den deutschen 
Banken, um Unterstützung für die Rettungspakete für Irland zu generieren” (ibid.) [“an axis 
from the European Union to the German banks in order to generate rescue packages for 
Ireland”]. The German economist argues that the German banks dramatised the crisis in order 
to get the political result they wanted emphasising that this is a game in which the creditor 
banks are the main winners:  
Und schon wieder wittern die deutschen Banken den großen Reibach. Wenn nämlich die EU 
an Irland Geld vergibt, wird es sicherer, in ganz Europa anzulegen – und die Banken machen 
wieder mehr Geschäft.…Die Politik macht das Spiel mit und schweigt über die Banken. Denn 
Bankenrettung ist seit HRE & Co nicht sehr populär. „Wir retten Irland, damit wir nicht die 
Banken retten müssen’, sagt Bankwissenschaftler Hans-Peter Burghof. Solidarität mit Irland 
ist politisch eher zu verkaufen als Solidarität mit Josef Ackermann. (ibid.) 
 
[And now the German banks smell another killing to be made. If the EU gives Ireland money, 
it will be safer to invest all over Europe – and banks can do more business again…. The 
powers that be are playing along and saying nothing about the banks. After all, bailing out 
banks isn’t very popular ever since HRE [Hypo Real Estate] & Co. ‘We are rescuing Ireland 
so that we don’t have to rescue the banks’, says banking expert Hans-Peter Burghof. 
Solidarity with Ireland is easier to sell than solidarity with Josef Ackermann.] 
 
The Süddeutsche Zeitung appears, in much of its reporting, to be critical of European 
Union governments for their handling of the crisis. For example, an article on the 18 November, 
2010 makes a clear distinction between Ireland and Greece underlining the fact that Ireland’s 
difficulties are the result of a banking crisis and the Irish state’s blanket guarantee for banking 
debts. It points out that while the Irish government should not have protected all its banks, the 
bank guarantee was necessary due to the risks involved for British, German and French 
financial institutions. The article explicitly allocates blame to political elites in Europe arguing 
that things would not be as bad as they are for Irish people today if European Union 
governments were less cowardly, inept and dishonest (Gammelin, 2010).  
Another article by Michael König in the Süddeutsche Zeitung a few days later focuses 
on the reaction to the bailout in Ireland highlighting the sense of humiliation in the nation and 
the attempt by Irish people to deal with it by means of black humour. He contrasts the former 
self-confidence of the Irish with the demoralisation felt after the announcement of the bailout 
by drawing on an animal image used by a caller to an Irish radio station in the headline, “Ein 
stolzes Land fühlt sich wie ein müder Gaul” [“A proud country feels like a tired nag”]. The 
article reflects the anger felt by Irish people towards the Irish government referring to a caption 
in the Irish Daily Star, “‘Our future, killed by wanker bankers and stupid politicians’ – unsere 
Zukunft, getötet von Wichser-Bankern und dummen Politikern” (König, 2010). König refers 
to the importance of sovereignty to the Irish consciousness and memories of the historical 
dominance of England which are prompted by the spectre of financial experts from London 
and Frankfurt deciding on the fate of the republic.  
A commentary article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung by Andreas Oldag on the same day 
also castigates the lack of solidarity in the Eurozone, arguing that the rescue package is not 
charity and that a small island state has been backed into a corner in a geopolitical game by the 
larger Eurozone members such as Germany and France.   
 Zudem bleibt das bittere Gefühl, dass der kleine Inselstaat im Nordwesten des 
Kontinents auf Drängen der groβen Euro-Mitglieder Deutschland und Frankreich als 
Exempel herhalten muss [...]. Das Ringen im irischen Drama zeigt erneut, wie innerlich 
zerrissen Euro-Land ist. Es gibt weder ein profundes Verständnis für die historische 
Entwicklung eines Landes...noch ein langfristiges Konzept für den Zusammenhalt der 
Währungsunion. Da passt ins Bild, mit welcher Chuzpe deutsche und französische 
Politiker fordern, dass die Iren als Bedingung für avisierte Hilfen ihre 
Niedrigsteuerpolitik ändern müssten. So wird die Gunst der Stunde genutzt, um Dublin 
vom angelsächsischen Wirtschaftsmodell abzubringen. Nur: Steuerharmonisierung ist 
gerade in der erweiterten Europäischen Union eine Schimäre. (Oldag, 2010) 
 
[In addition, the bitter feeling remains that the small island nation in the Northwest of 
the Continent has to serve as an example at the insistence of the larger Euro members, 
Germany and France [...] The struggle in the Irish drama shows again how internally 
divided the Eurozone is. There is neither a profound understanding of the historical 
development of a country nor a long-term concept for the cohesion of the currency 
union. Further proof of this is the chutzpe with which German and French politicians 
demand that the Irish change their low taxation rate as a condition for their support. 
So the situation is being used to divert Dublin from the Anglo-Saxon economic 
model. However: tax harmonisation is but a chimera in an enlarged European Union.]    
 
In a similar vein, Spiegel International is critical of the treatment of the Irish state by 
the EU, ECB and the German government. On 8 December 2010, Carsten Volkery writes,  
The EU has failed to make the foreign bondholders take a hit on the losses from toxic 
real estate loans. In particular, the ECB insisted that the interests of the German, British 
and French banks would continue to be protected. Instead, Irish taxpayers are being 
asked to pay the bill: at a hefty interest rate of 5.8 percent, to ensure the foreign creditors 
will get their money back rather than face any losses. 
This may be something German banks welcome, but it is a disaster for Ireland […] 
“This ‘bailout’ will sink the Republic,” warns economist David McWilliams in the 
Belfast Telegraph. “It is the EU giving us enough rope to hang ourselves in the hope 
that we don’t hang all of them.” (Volkery, 2010) 
 
In an interview with leading German economist Peter Bofinger in Spiegel International, 
Germany’s interest in propping up Ireland is discussed, alluding to the fact that “German banks 
are Ireland’s biggest creditors, to the tune of 166 billion euro”. According to Bofinger,  
[the] German government has a vital interest in ensuring the solvency of the Irish state 
and its banks […] the rescue of the Irish banks would also mean the rescue of German 
financial institutions. The arrears that Irish debtors owe to foreign banks amount to 
around 320 percent of Ireland’s gross domestic product. One has to ask oneself if the 
Irish state would ever be in a position to meet such huge commitments. (Schultz, 2010) 
 
Bofinger also criticises the punitive character of the rescue package proposed by the German 
government as a form of discipline7 and states that the “German government shares some of 
the blame for the Irish debacle by causing interest rates on state bonds to soar because of 
Berlin’s demand that investors also incur losses in the case of a state insolvency”, pointing 
out that “while the principle was correct the timing of such a vague statement was unwise” 
(ibid.). An article in the German business newspaper Handelsblatt on 1 December 2010 by 
                                                             
7 “The German government would like to see punitive interest rates linked with any EU aid payments – a sort of 
disciplinary method to force indebted states to save. [… ] ‘I [Bofinger] think that is a dangerous fallacy. Euro-
zone countries apply for help when they have extreme financial difficulties. It is certainly not helpful to then 
accentuate these difficulties by adding on further interest. It is also better for Germany when problem countries 
succeed in paying off their debts at relatively favourable interest rates, rather than pushing them into insolvency 
by adding a punitive surcharge of 3 percent’ […] ” (Schultz, 2010). 
Barry Eichengreen, Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of 
California Berkeley, is highly critical of the European solution to Ireland’s crisis arguing that 
the economic burden imposed on the country is a disaster, comparing it to Germany’s 
reparations burden after World War I.8 Spiegel International cites Eichengreen’s article in a 
piece entitled, “The EU is Pushing Ireland to the Brink of Ruin”: 
“It would be neither politically or economically sustainable to force Ireland to pay 10 percent 
of its national income as reparations to bondholders…as anyone who remembers Germany’s 
own experience with World War I reparations should know.” It would be more sensible to 
have a debt restructuring and offer the bondholders 20 cents on the euro, he argues. 9 
(Volkery, 2010) 
 
 The dominant narrative of Ireland’s success in atoning for past sins is also contested by 
Paul Krugman, in an article in Der Spiegel in 2012. He argues that the notion that the crisis 
was caused by irresponsible national budgetary management is a myth (except in the case of 
Greece) which European elites cling to in spite of the evidence to the contrary. According to 
Krugman, the moralising discourse adopted by European leaders that crisis countries have 
sinned and therefore must pay the penalty is unhelpful as it simply disguises the real issues 
which need to be addressed in Europe.  
Doch viele europäische Verantwortliche, allen voran deutsche Politiker, die Führung der 
Europäischen Zentralbank und die Meinungsführer in der Finanzwelt, wiederholen 
gebetsmühlenartig die große Täuschung und lassen sich auch von handfesten 
Gegenbeweisen nicht erschüttern. Sie kleiden das Problem gern in ein moralisches Gewand: 
Die betroffenen Länder haben gesündigt, und nun müssen sie büßen – ein ganz schlechter 
Ansatz zur Lösung der eigentlichen Probleme des Kontinents. (Krugman, 2012) 
  
[However, many European leaders, above all German politicians, the directors of the 
European central bank and opinion makers in the financial world repeat mantra-like the 
                                                             
8 “The Irish “rescue package” finalized over the weekend is a disaster. You can say one thing for the European 
Commission, the ECB and the German government: they never miss an opportunity to make things worse. […] 
The Irish “program” solves exactly nothing – it simply kicks the can down the road. A public debt that will now 
top out at around 130 per cent of GDP has not been reduced by a single cent. The interest payments that the Irish 
sovereign will have to make have not been reduced by a single cent, given the rate of 5.8% on the international 
loan. After a couple of years, not just interest but also principal is supposed to begin (sic) to be repaid. Ireland 
will be transferring nearly 10 per cent of its national income as reparations to the bondholders, year after painful 
year.This is not politically sustainable, as anyone who remembers Germany’s own experience with World War I 
reparations should know.” Quote from Handelsblatt translated by Kevin O’Rourke, Barry Eichengreen on the 
Irish Crisis, 1.12.2010. https://mailman.ucsd.edu/pipermail /europeanstudies -l/2010q4/000374.html. See 
original article in Eichengreen, Handelsblatt, 1.12.2010. Accessed October 14, 2013. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/irland-jaemmerliches-versagen; 2702860. 
9 See Dan Mulhall: „Die irischen Steuerzahler haben eine enorme Last der von den Banken versursachten 
Schulden getragen – die getragene Last entspricht ca. 40% unseres BIP. Können Sie sich vorstellen, wie 
schwierig eine nämliche Situation für die deutschen Steuerzahler wäre?“ Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) 
Mecklenburg-VorpommernIHK, Rostock, 19. Juni 2013. Accessed 5 July, 2013. 
http://www.embassyofireland.de/uploads/documents/embassy/Berlin%20EM/de_rostock%20eiz_19%20juni%2
02013.pdf. 
great myth and will not be convinced by hard facts. They like to cloak the problem in terms 
of morality. The countries in question have sinned and now they must atone for it – a 
completely negative approach to solving the actual problems of the Continent.]   
 
Austerity Debate: Dissenting Voices and Shifts in Perspective 
The role of European banks in the Irish financial crisis was a subject of renewed interest in 
sections of the German media in 2013 against the background of a growing debate about the 
merits of austerity policies in the European Union. The austerity model appeared to have been 
accepted as a given up to this point by Irish citizens in contrast to their counterparts in southern 
European countries. There was also broad consensus among political leaders regarding the 
conventional wisdom of this path. However, a wider debate on the merits and morality of 
austerity began to gain momentum in public discourse among senior EU politicians 
(Barrosso10, Rehn, van Rompuy) and leading academics (Rogoff & Reinhart) inter alia.11 The 
Irish President, Michael D. Higgins, called for a “‘rethink’ of how EU leaders were handling 
the crisis” and criticised the assumption of a “single hegemonic model” suggesting instead the 
need for a “pluralism of approaches” given the diversity of issues which needed to be addressed 
within the union (Smyth, 2013a). According to Higgins, “The EU must drop its ‘hegemonic’ 
economic model and reform the European Central Bank or risk social upheaval and a loss of 
popular legitimacy…” (ibid.).12 The intervention of the Irish President in the debate on the 
Eurozone crisis, while pushing the traditional boundaries of the Presidential role, found broad 
resonance across a wide spectrum of society and was endorsed by the Irish government (Smyth, 
2013b). As an editorial in the Financial Times argued, his cogent and eloquent arguments about 
a ‘moral crisis’ in the EU and alternative proposals for economic growth, underline the current 
lack of solidarity within the EU. 
The most powerful of the President’s appeals is for a moral and social discourse to match 
the technical discussion of the Eurozone’s problems. Politicians from all over Europe have 
shied away from the open political debate that is needed to generate political solidarity in 
                                                             
10See Gammelin, 2013.  
11 Conservative politicians in Germany and elsewhere have relied on economic principles advocated by Harvard 
academics Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart – that a debt to GDP ratio above 90 per cent is bad for 
economic growth – to justify fiscal policies of austerity. Doubt has now been cast on the accuracy of this 
research and Rogoff and Reinhart themselves contend that “austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem” 
arguing that, “We must remember that the choice is not simply between tight-fisted austerity and freewheeling 
spending. Governments have used a wide range of options over the ages. It is time to return to the toolkit” 
(Rogoff and Reinhart, 2013). See also Schrank, “Angela’s commandments.” The Economist, 3 February, 2012. 
12 “The Irish President also criticised EU leaders for not separating bank debt from sovereign debt. Ireland’s 
government finances were overwhelmed in 2010 when Dublin bailed out the country’s banks but did not impose 
losses on their bondholders” (Smyth, 2013b). 
the EU [….] His most concrete policy recommendation is to separate bank and sovereign 
debt. The broader point is surely that it is wrong to indenture citizens to bail out risk-taking 
investors. Yet Cyprus aside, the Eurozone elite still treats forced restructuring as taboo. Here 
is one issue where a poet-politician ought to break the conventional wisdom. (Presidential 
Poetry, 2013) 
 
In 2013 a renewed emphasis on the moral and social dimension of the Irish crisis 
became evident in German media coverage of the topic. A German documentary broadcast on 
the German/French television channel Arte on 26 February 2013, “Staatsgeheimnis, 
Bankenrettung” [“State Secret, Bank Rescue”] challenged the dominant perception in Germany 
of Ireland’s role in the Eurozone crisis. In this investigative-style documentary, financial 
journalist, Harald Schumann, and documentary maker, Arpad Bondy, contest the idea that 
German taxpayers’ money is bailing out Irish citizens and other peripheral countries and argue 
that, on the contrary, Irish and German taxpayers’ money is flowing into the coffers of Europe’s 
financial elite. This documentary emphasises how Europe’s political leaders closed ranks in 
protecting the interests of international investors by forcing the Irish state to stand over its 
banking guarantee, refusing to countenance burden sharing on the part of European creditor 
institutions who could have absorbed those losses. Schumann and Bondy travel to Ireland and 
other crisis countries to present an alternative view of how the crisis is affecting ordinary 
people, giving them a voice. The film presents a cross-section of Irish society, from the 
Ballyhea protestors in Co. Cork to government ministers, economists and journalists. While 
much of the mainstream German media portrays the Irish as compliant and resigned to atoning 
for past sins, this documentary focuses on a small pocket of Irish resistance, ordinary citizens 
in a remote outpost who refuse to capitulate to the powerful forces of the Eurozone. Schumann 
perceives the protesters as courageous in standing up to the might of the European financial 
and political elites and highlights the extreme suffering inflicted on ordinary people who had 
no part in creating the crisis but are now being left to carry an impossible burden.  
Schumann and Bondy focus on the power relations and moral issues surrounding the crisis 
in Ireland and other peripheral countries, subverting the widespread assumption that Ireland 
has been rescued by its European partners and in particular by German taxpayers. Instead they 
reveal how all European taxpayers, including the Irish, have been coerced into protecting 
investors from losses with catastrophic consequences for the weakest in society and the 
younger generation. 13  In this documentary Schumann attempts to discover where the €70 
billion that Ireland has spent in rescuing its banks has actually gone. In response to the question 
of who the beneficiaries are, Schumann is stonewalled by finance ministers in Ireland, Spain 
and Germany, the EU commission and the ECB. In responding to his question, ECB director, 
Jörg Asmussen, refers to “Geschäftsgeheimnisse” [business secrets] while German finance 
minister Wolfgang Schäuble dismisses the question cursorily explaining that banks are all 
inextricably linked to one another and the domino effect had to be prevented (Schumann, 
2013a). 
This subject is also highlighted by Schumann in Der Tagesspiegel crystallised in the following 
headline: 
Staatsgeheimnis Bankenrettung: Rettet Deutschland wirklich Spanien, Irland und die 
anderen Krisenländer? Eine Recherchereise durch Europa offenbart: Die vielen Milliarden 
an Steuergeldern schützen vor allem wohlhabende Anleger vor Verlusten – meist sind es 
Deutsche. Die Regierungen und Zentralbanker wollen das am liebsten verschleiern. 
(Schumann, 2013b) 
  
[State secret, bank rescue: Is Germany really rescuing Spain, Ireland and the other crisis 
countries? A research trip through Europe reveals: the many billions of taxpayers’ money is 
primarily protecting wealthy investors – mainly German – from losses. Governments and 
central bankers would prefer to cover it up.]  
 
In this article, Schumann argues that Schäuble’s response to his question about who is 
benefiting from the bank rescue is simplistic, serving only to protect vested interests with 
disastrous consequences for Ireland: “Kein Land hat das härter getroffen als Irland” [“No 
country has been harder hit than Ireland”]. Schumann points out that Ireland had one of the 
lowest sovereign debt rates of the Eurozone in 2007 explaining that the currency union led to 
low interest rates creating the conditions for a property bubble.  
Allein die deutschen Banken schleusten in den drei Jahren nach 2005 mehr als 100 
Milliarden Euro nach Irland, so viel wie zwei Drittel einer Jahreswirtschaftsleistung des 
kleinen Landes. Mit dem geliehenen Geld befeuerten die sechs irischen Banken einen 
Immobilienboom, der selbst jenen in den USA noch übertraf. (ibid.)  
  
[German bankers alone pumped more than 100 billion Euro into Ireland in the three years 
after 2005, as much as two thirds of the annual economic output of the small country. With 
the borrowed money the six Irish banks fuelled a property boom, which surpassed even that 
of the USA.] 
 
                                                             
13 Facts about emigration are highlighted in the documentary stating that more than a thousand Irish people have 
emigrated every week since the crisis began, the biggest wave of emigration since the famine in the nineteenth 
century.  
In addition to investigating the roots of the Euro crisis, Schumann also highlights the 
secrecy surrounding the names of the creditors who were to be repaid in full with taxpayers’ 
money in the aftermath of the crash. In the autumn of 2010, when the bank guarantee given by 
the Irish Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, threatened to bankrupt the Irish state, the opposition 
demanded that the names of the bondholders be made public. The then finance minister, Brian 
Lenihan, stated that the bonds were anonymous and the owners were not known. Schumann 
maintains that this was not the case, as Paul Staines, a former bond trader, with the help of 
former colleagues, published the names of eighty financial institutions that held bonds for 
Anglo Irish Bank worth billions of euros. He maintains the list read like a Who’s Who of the 
western financial world ranging from the German Allianz Concern to Goldman Sachs to the 
French Société Générale, all of whom could easily have taken losses. He cites Irish economist 
Constantin Gurdgiev who argues, “Auch Deutschland habe einen Immobilienboom gehabt. [...] 
Nur hätten die Deutschen‚ es vorgezogen, ihren Boom ins Ausland zu verlegen” (ibid.) 
[“Germany also had a property boom […] but the Germans preferred to move their boom 
abroad”].  
 Schumann is highly critical of the role of the ECB in refusing to allow a write-down of 
creditor bonds to market value which would have reduced the burden by €30 billion. He 
maintains that this was supported by the IMF but vetoed by an ECB German official at the 
behest of Jean-Claude Trichet. The question of whether bondholders should share in the losses 
was dealt a final blow when Timothy Geithner, acting as a lobbyist for the finance industry, 
insisted that all bank loans be repaid in full (ibid.). Under pressure from the US government, 
the IMF no longer insisted on burden sharing and in November 2010 Ireland’s government 
agreed to the European rescue deal. This package guaranteed €67.5 billion credit but the article 
concurs with the argument of the Irish politician, Stephen Donnelly, that what amounts to 
blackmail by the ECB burdens the Irish state with debts of more than €100 billion, in order to 
cover losses which private banks had incurred with private investors. When Ireland elected a 
new government, it too was powerless to involve bondholders in sharing losses as the ECB 
remained opposed to such a step.  
So mündet die vermeintliche Rettung Irlands in ein Schutzprogramm für Banken und 
Kapitalanleger, für deren Fehlinvestitionen auf der grünen Insel allein die irischen 
Steuerbürger bezahlen sollen. Die ‚Übertragung aller Bankschulden auf den Staat’ sei ein 
‚schrecklicher Fehler’ gewesen, urteilt heute Irlands stellvertretender Finanzminister Brian 
Hayes, ein Fehler, aus dem andere Staaten lernen sollten. (ibid.) 
 
[Thus ends the supposed rescue of Ireland in a protection program for banks and investors 
for whose failed investments in the green island the Irish taxpayer alone must pay. “The 
transfer of all banks debts to the state” was a “terrible mistake” according to Ireland’s current 
junior finance minister, Brian Hayes, a mistake from which other countries should learn.] 
 
Schumann’s controversial findings were also broadcast by Deutschlandradio on 26 February 
2013, in an interview with Frank Meyer entitled‚“Bankenrettung: Investoren wurden vor 
Verlusten geschützt” [“Bank rescue: Investors were protected from losses”]. In this interview, 
Schumann reiterates the point, which has received little attention in public debate that 
anonymous European financial institutions have been bailed out by the Irish taxpayer, contrary 
to the common perception that the German taxpayer is bailing out the Irish state.  
Dieser Zusammenhang wurde sehr wenig beleuchtet in der öffentlichen Debatte, stattdessen 
ging es immer nur darum, ob jetzt die armen deutschen Steuerzahler für die Partymacher in 
den anderen Krisenstaaten haften müssen. Dass es letztlich darum ging, anlagesuchendes 
Kapital aus Deutschland, Frankreich und anderen Eurostaaten vor Verlusten zu schützen, 
wurde häufig nicht thematisiert. (Schumann, 2013c)   
 
[This aspect has received very little attention in public debate, instead it has always been 
about whether the poor German taxpayer must pay for the party animals in the other crisis 
states. The fact that ultimately it was about protecting investment capital from Germany, 
France and other Euro states from losses was often not discussed.] 
 
 A similar reappraisal of the crisis was the subject of analysis in Die Zeit on 27 March 
2013 in an extensive article entitled “Die Spieler und die Dealer” [“The Players and the 
Dealers”]. It also presents an alternative narrative to the dominant one in German public 
discourse. This article raises the question of who has benefited from the Euro rescue package 
and whether the Germans are really the victims of the crisis, as they perceive themselves to be.  
Sind die Deutschen die Opfer der Krise, als die sie sich sehen? Oder haben sie die Krise 
angeheizt: als Finanziers ausländischer Banken, die ihrerseits Geld in nationale Blasen 
pumpten? Und wollen sie den Euro retten – oder nur die eigenen Einlagen? (Bittner & Scally, 
2013)  
 
[Are the Germans really the victims of the crisis as they perceive themselves to be? Or did 
they add fuel to the crisis as financiers of foreign banks who pumped money into national 
bubbles? And do they want to rescue the Euro – or simply their own deposits?] 
 
While acknowledging that blame lies mainly with the Irish themselves because too many of 
them allowed themselves to be blinded by the boom and borrowed too much, the article focuses 
on the role of German banks in generating the crisis – German investment in Ireland rose from 
€39 billion in 2003 to €135 billion in 2008 – and the role of German politicians14 in giving a 
                                                             
14 It is interesting to note that former finance minister Peer Steinbrueck did not wish to comment on the question 
of whether the SPD/CDU coalition encouraged banks to take more risks. Jörg Asmussen, a prominent figure in 
green light for banks to speculate, quoting German economist Henrik Enderlein on government 
policy of deregulating German banks:15 
„Für die Banker war es immer klar: Die Regierung würde private deutsche Groβbanken 
niemals pleitegehen lassen. Es gab eine implizite Haftgarantie für sie.“ Im Grunde, so 
Enderlein, sei das so gewesen, „als würden Sie einem Spieler Millionenkredite geben und 
ihn damit ins Kasino schicken.“ Zum Beispiel nach Irland. (ibid.) 
 
[“For the bankers it was always clear. The government would never let private German big 
banks go bankrupt. There was an implicit guarantee for them.” Basically, according to 
Enderlein, “it was like giving millions of Euros worth of credit to a gambler and sending him 
to a casino.” For example, to Ireland.] 
     
While not absolving Irish people of responsibility for their mistakes, the article underlines the 
disastrous consequences for ordinary citizens,  
[...] 64 Milliarden Euro lassen sich die Iren die Rettung ihres Bankensektors letzlich kosten. 
Um den Staatshaushalt wieder auszugleichen, verordnete die Regierung den Bürgern höhere 
Steuern und niedrigere Löhne. Bis 2030...werden 30 Prozent des irischen 
Wirtschaftsprodukts in die Tilgung der Bankenrettung flieβen. Die irische Bevölkerung 
kommt also noch viele Jahre lang für die Verluste von Banken, ihren Geldgebern und 
Teilnehmern auf. Für Verluste, die eigentlich jeder selbst tragen sollte, der mit seinem Geld 
spekuliert. (ibid.) 
 
[It is costing the Irish €64 billion to rescue their banks. In order to balance the budget the 
Irish government has implemented tax increases and spending cuts. Up to 2030, 30% of Irish 
economic product will go towards servicing the bank rescue. Irish citizens will have to carry 
the can for many years for the losses of banks, investors and shareholders. For losses, which 
people who speculate with money should carry themselves.] 
 
Bittner and Scally point out that while Ireland has made a sacrifice for Europe, the Irish have 
received very little in return, a situation which undermines respect for democracy. The article 
concludes that this view is echoed by other crisis countries, which see German banks as the 
ones who have profited the most from the financial rescue, but that this has fallen on deaf ears 
in Berlin.  
 
German Media Reaction to the Anglo Irish Bank Tapes Scandal  
                                                             
the German federal department of finance since 2003 and since 2012 a director of the ECB, declined an 
interview with Die Zeit and the Irish Times commenting that he did not wish to speak about former activities.  
15 This is the subject of a play written by Andres Veiel, a well-known German film director. “The Raspberry 
Reich”, based on anonymised interviews with bankers in Frankfurt, Dublin and other financial capitals, has been 
sold out for months at the Deutsches Theater in Berlin. “‘We were read the riot act,’ one banker told Andres 
Veiel. ‘Germany was increasingly falling behind London and New York as a financial centre. We should get 
with it, get into more risk, expand the derivatives and structured finance products, finally get modern.’” (Scally 
& Bittner, 2013). 
 
Ireland’s efforts to rebuild its damaged reputation on the international stage unexpectedly 
suffered a major setback on 24 June 2013 with the publication by the Irish Independent of taped 
conversations between senior bankers in Anglo Irish Bank which took place during the period 
surrounding the fateful Irish bank guarantee of 30 September 2008. Commentators have 
described the content of these transcripts as “diplomatic dynamite” as the tone and content of 
the remarks are highly offensive, mocking both Irish government officials and German 
investors (“Inside the bubble”, 2013). John Bowe is heard singing “Deutschland Deutschland 
über alles” while David Drumm laughed and joked about abusing the state banking guarantee 
and made fun of an Irish official who was concerned that activities at Anglo Irish Bank were 
causing tensions between Ireland and Germany (Smyth, 2013c). The scandal sent shock waves 
throughout Ireland and Europe and generated extremely negative and damaging headlines 
about Ireland in the German media. Spiegel online led with the headline, “Telefonmitschnitt: 
Wenn irische Banker ‘Deutschland über alles’ singen” [“Telephone recording: When Irish 
bankers sing ‘Deutschland über alles’”] focusing on the insults to German investors in the bank 
in the introductory paragraph (Telefonmitschnitt, 2013). The damage inflicted on German-Irish 
relations was particularly evident in the uncharacteristically blunt style of the coverage in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, revealing the level of outrage felt at the taped conversations 
between senior bankers at Anglo-Irish Bank. The imagery in one commentary article is 
particularly graphic stating that all those involved in the Anglo disaster should be put in a sack 
and get a thorough walloping16 (Braunberger, 2013). The topic also made the front page of Bild 
which led with the headline “Irische Pleite-Banker verhöhnten deutsche Kunden” [“Irish 
bankrupt bankers mock German customers”] (“Irische Pleite Banker”, 2013). The furore which 
ensued from these revelations cast a shadow over a successful Irish Presidency of the European 
Union as it came to a close in June 2013. Angela Merkel was scathing in her comments about 
the Anglo Irish Bank tapes saying that this kind of banker talk does real damage to democracy 
and social market economics.17 However, reports in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, albeit 
                                                             
16 “Anglo Irish Bank: Die überheblichen Banker: Alle diejenigen, die das Desaster um die Anglo Irish Bank 
angerichtet haben, gehören in einen Sack gesteckt und verhauen. So etwas darf einfach nicht passieren. Eine 
Abrechnung” (Braunberger, 2013). Presumably, a reference to the Christmas story of St. Nicklaus beating 
naughty children. 
17 See response in a Martyn Turner cartoon depicting a cat, a pig and a cigar-smoking capitalist holding a banner 
with the words “Angela Merkel thinks Social Market Economics are Working”. Caption in the corner states: 
“The Banksters and their ilk…They haven’t gone away you know” (See Turner, 2013).  
damaging for Ireland, also made clear that Merkel’s anger appeared to be directed at a culture 
endemic in the banking world in general, 18   
 “Ich kann nur sagen, die Tonalität scheint bankenübergreifend gleich zu sein”, sagte sie in 
der Nacht zu Freitag in Brüssel. “Und sie ist für Menschen, die ganz normal jeden Tag zur 
Arbeit gehen, die ihr Geld verdienen, einfach nur ganz, ganz schwer zu verkraften, um nicht 
zu sagen, gar nicht zu verkraften.” (“Merkel kritisiert irische Banker”, 2013)  
 
[“I can only say the tonality seems to be the same across the banking sector”, she said late on 
Thursday night in Brussels. “And for people who go to work every day, who earn their 
money, it is very, very difficult to cope with, if not to say impossible to cope with.”]   
 
Merkel’s statement at the EU summit on 28 June 2013 led to further coverage in the German 
press with subsequent reports in dailies such as Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt and by 
broadcasters such as Deutsche Welle and ARD (tagesschau) creating extremely bad press for 
Ireland at a critical time in European Union negotiations. This negative coverage of Ireland 
came at a particularly inopportune moment for the country on the eve of a European Union 
summit deliberating on a banking union for the Eurozone and on the question of retrospective 
recapitalisation of bailed-out banks. Ironically, it represented one of the lowest points for 
Ireland in terms of German media reaction to the Irish banking crisis almost five years after the 
crash. The spectre of Anglo Irish Bank seemed to rise from its grave to once again tarnish 
Ireland’s reputation making it harder for Irish politicians to convince Eurozone partners to lift 
some of the debt burdening Irish taxpayers. As an editorial in the Financial Times argued,  
By taking on the liabilities of the banking system in full, Irish taxpayers have rescued foreign 
creditors, who should have taken a hit for the crash. When Eurozone leaders decide about 
Ireland’s bank debt, they should not use the behaviour of a few reckless bankers as an excuse 
to punish an entire country. (“Inside the bubble”, 2013) 
 
However, despite attempts by the Irish government to resolve this issue, it is unlikely that it 
will be addressed at European level in the near future. 
 
Conclusion 
While it is true that Ireland has been portrayed ostensibly in a generally positive light by the 
German media since the bailout in 2010, it can be argued that the construction of Ireland in 
much of the coverage is also characterised by certain assumptions which reflect a particular 
economic metanarrative. This dominant discourse in the German media assigns unambiguous 
roles to the respective protagonists which uncritically mediate and perpetuate a hegemonic and 
                                                             
18 In a press briefing at the EU summit in Brussels she cites “The Raspberry Kingdom” inferring that the 
“arrogant banker tone is not uniquely Irish” (See Scally, 2013). 
polarising discourse. A critical analysis of the language of this corpus of media texts shows 
how this is cued in much of the coverage both explicitly and implicitly through the selection 
of themes and topics, a moralising tone and the use of metaphors and tropes suggesting 
stereotypical hetero-images. The overall positive perception of Ireland’s performance in the 
context of the Eurozone crisis has also been punctuated by censure in the German media at 
critical moments in negotiations revealing perhaps the true nature of German-Irish media 
relations and an underlying strategy of instrumentalisation of Ireland’s image at a political 
level. However, this dominant perception of Ireland has also been contested across certain 
sections of the German print and broadcast media. The alternative construction is underpinned 
by a moral and social discourse which takes solidarity between member states as its point of 
reference and eschews an ethnocentric, “them and us” discourse. In broad terms, it sees Ireland 
not as a country atoning for past sins but rather as a nation of fellow citizens, within the context 
of the European Union, shouldering a disproportionate burden alongside German citizens in 
order to bail out anonymous European financial institutions. This solidarity discourse gained 
some momentum during the first months of 2013 in sections of the German press and broadcast 
media but was subsequently overshadowed by extensive coverage of the Anglo Irish Bank 
tapes scandal in June of that year. 
This study shows that German media coverage of Ireland during the Eurozone crisis has to 
a large extent remained at the level of stereotype, through the widespread use of tropes 
signifying recklessness, irresponsibility and incompetence such as the ‘casino’, the ‘problem 
child’, ‘model pupil’ and an ethnocentric “them and us” discourse. This narrative has, however, 
also been contested by commentators and with the passing of time there is evidence of a more 
nuanced understanding of the broader parameters of the crisis. For instance, one of the more 
interesting recent developments coinciding with Ireland’s exit from the bailout has been the 
emergence of the voice of the individual. Until recently the political and institutional discussion 
has dominated media construction of Ireland’s role in the crisis but now that the big decisions 
have been made at a pan-European level, individual voices – of both citizens and bankers – are 
being heard. The voice of the ordinary citizen resonates through Harald Schumann’s portrayal 
of the Ballyhea protestors from West Cork in his television documentary broadcast on Arte. 
Coincidentally, the voices of individual bankers are also emerging through media coverage of 
the Anglo Irish Bank tape transcripts serving as a reminder of the culture that Ireland realises 
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